Double jeopardy, in law, protection against the use by the state of certain multiple forms of prosecution.
Double jeopardy is a procedural defense that prevents a defendant from being tried multiple times on the same or similar charge, following a legitimate acquittal or conviction.
The concept of double jeopardy is a longstanding norm in Western legal thought, having roots in both Greek and Roman Law. As a result, the tradition of double jeopardy is present in a great number of modern legal regimes in one form or another.
Many countries have codified protections against double jeopardy as a constitutional right, including Canada, India, Israel, Mexico and the United States.
In the common law, a defendant may enter a preemptory plea of double jeopardy, indicating to the court that the defendant had previously been acquitted or convicted of the same offense.
Once the issue is raised, evidence will be presented in order to rule as a preliminary matter whether the plea is substantiated and, if it is, the projected trial will not proceed.
Generally, protections against double jeopardy prevent a person from being convicted twice for the same crime based on the same conduct.
If a person robs a bank, he cannot be convicted of robbery twice for the same actions.
Similarly, a defendant cannot be twice convicted on two different crimes arising from the same conduct unless they are significantly different or designed to prohibit different forms of conduct.
For instance, a person may not be convicted of both murder and manslaughter for the same killing, but he can be convicted of both murder and robbery if the murder arose out of said robbery. Double jeopardy is related to the theory of collateral Estoppel, which prevents the same parties from relitigating facts that have already been established by a final judgment.
However, double jeopardy does not generally prohibit the government from bringing a civil action against a defendant for the same offense, even after the defendant is acquitted of the crime. Additionally, acquittal in one jurisdiction does not necessarily bar trial in another for the same offense.
As defined by jurisprudence, it simply means that a person cannot be charged with a same or identical crime when such person was already previously convicted or acquitted of a similar crime (See Carmelo vs People, GR L-3580, 22 March 1950, En Banc).
The rule against double jeopardy is constitutionally-protected as it is enshrined in Article III, Section 21 of the Fundamental Law.
“No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by law or an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.”
Rule 117 Section 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information under any of the following instances: (a) the graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act or omission constituting the former charge; (b) the facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered only after a plea was entered in the former complaint or information; or (c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the prosecutor and of the offended party except as provided in section 1 (f) of Rule 116.
In any of the foregoing cases, where the accused satisfies or serves in whole or in part the judgment, he shall be credited with the same in the event of conviction for the graver offense.
The dismissal of a criminal case upon motion of the accused because the prosecution was not prepared for trial since the complainant and his witnesses did not appear at the trial, is a dismissal equivalent to an acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the defendant for the same offense [Salcedo vs. Mendoza, L-49375, February 28, 1979, 88 SCRA 811; Lagunilia vs. Hon. Reyes, etc. and Motas, 111 Phil. 1020 citing People vs. Tacneng, 105 Phil. 1298 and People vs. Robles, 105 Phil. 1016. See Taladua vs. Ochotorena, L-25595, February 15, 1974, 55 SCRA 528; Acebedo vs. Sarmiento, L-28025, December 16, 1970, 36 SCRA 247; Baesa vs. Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Sur, L-30363, January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 437; People vs. Cloribel, 120 Phil. 775; People vs. Abaño 97 Phil. 28; People vs. Labate, 107 Phil. 697]
Once an accused is acquitted, the prosecution may no longer file an appeal on account of double jeopardy (See Villareal vs Aliga, GR 166995, 13 January 2014).
Nevertheless, (1) where there has been deprivation of due process, (2) where there is a finding of a mistrial, or (3) where there has been a grave abuse of discretion, the rule against double jeopardy does NOT apply (People vs Alejandro, GR 223099, 11 January 2018).
The aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to assail the wrongful acquittal of an accused on the ground of grave abuse of discretion (See People vs Laguio, GR 128587, 16 March 2007).
In other cases, the SC considered the following as specific acts of denial of due process where the rule against double jeopardy will not lie: (1) purely capricious dismissal of an information (People vs Alberto, GR 132374, 22 August 2002); (2) dismissal of a criminal case merely because none of the witnesses appeared during pre-trial (People vs Judge Tac-an, GR 148000, 27 February 2003); and (3) the trial was a sham (People vs Dante Tan, GR 167526, 26 July 2010).